니콜라옙스크 사건/학계연구 및 사료 문서/역사학계

Феномен Зыкова-Рогова не был единичным: в томже Кузнецком уезде действовали и другие «красные»банды. Другим масштабным аналогом роговской резни была так называемая амурская трагедия. Весной1920 г. в Николаевске-на-Амуре красные партизаныпод руководством 23-летнего анархо-коммунистаЯкова Тряпицына расстреляли несколько сотен пленных японцев. Затем развернулось планомерное уничтожение жителей города, которых разделили на пятькатегорий по «этноклассовому» принципу. Городбыл сожжен, в ходе десятидневной резни погибло до2,5 тыс. человек (называли и большие цифры). Тряпицына (из крестьян), начальника его штаба НинуЛебедеву (21-летнюю москвичку) и пятерых их подельников большевики расстреляли по стандартному обвинению в дискредитации советской власти [9,с. 1026].

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Булдаков, Владимир Прохорович. "Гражданская война и проза 1920-х годов." Гуманитарные исследования в Восточной Сибири и на Дальнем Востоке 5 (25) (2013), 117쪽

『Основная часть перешедших в Россию мятежных корейцев ориентировалась на Иркутск, остальные – на свою революционную фракцию в Шанхае. При этом сепаратно настроенные «прошанхайские» партизанские вожаки особого Сахалинского партизанскогоотряда были активными участниками дикой резни населения в Сахалинской области иНиколаевске-на-Амуре в 1919–1920 гг., являясь важным ударным отрядом террористической армии анархиста Я. И. Тряпицына. Вполне естественно, что, уйдя под натискомяпонской армии летом 1920 г. с низовьев Амура и расположившись в окрестностях Благовещенска, они привычным образом с помощью оружия решали и вопросы снабжения, иличные конфликты. Еще в конце июля 1920 г. главком НРА Г. Х. Эйхе и его помощник пополитчасти В. Г. Бисярин приказали провести чистку корейско-китайского полка, средибойцов и комсостава которого была отмечена «масса преступлений служебного и политического характера»44. Эффективность подобных мер оказалась невелика. И попытки переподчинить корейцев мирным путем, как свидетельствует переписка советских военных ипартийных властей, оказались безуспешными.

Главком Эйхе в январе 1921 г. выдал мандат члену корейской секции при ДальбюроЦК РКП(б) и представителю Амурского обкома Корейской компартии Ивану ДаниловичуПак-Чан-Ыну для разрешения военных вопросов в корейских партизанских отрядах и поделам созыва в феврале партизанского съезда в Чите или Хабаровске – с правом отстранения командиров отрядов и «ареста лиц, оказывающих препятствие при разрешении им означенных вопросов»45. Тогда же все члены корейской секции Дальбюро, а также командиры особого Сахалинского отряда Иннокентий Ким и Илья Пак «за их недисциплинированность в партийных работах» постановлением Дальне-Восточного секретариата ИККИбыли лишены полномочий, причем Пак и Ким оказались на короткое время под следствием Амурского облотдела Госполитохраны (И. Пак обвинялся как ярый сторонник «авантюриста Тряпицына» и колчаковский контрразведчик, а И. Ким, бывший прапорщик русской армии, ранее, в 1920 г. в Иркутске Особым отделом 5-й армии арестовывался за уклонение от службы в НРА и был освобожден на поруки ).

Чрезвычайная Корейская военная конференция, прошедшая 11 марта 1921 г. в Читепод председательством Цой-Кван-Юна, представителя Кандонского партизанского отрядаКим-Квана и других, постановила отстранить командира особого Сахалинского отрядаИ. Кима и его военкома И. Пака с преданием их военно-полевому суду «за разложениеполка». Им вменялись внесение сепаратизма в Николаевские роты и ссоры командованияполка с рядовыми бойцами, а также доносы; они «не приостановили убийства самосудомВасилия Пака, бывшего командира корейского отряда Николаевского района, совершенное партизанами-николаевцами». Ким и Пак, переходя с отрядом из г. Свободного в сельскую местность, «позволили стрелкам мародерничать и чинить насилия над мирными русскими крестьянами», которые в ответ озлобились, требуя разоружения корейских партизан и вооружения их, крестьян, для отпора корейцам. Также Ким и Пак, «создав группубезответственных террористов из числа николаевцев, наводили панику на солдат и лицкомандного состава Корейского отдельного стрелкового батальона»47

Безвластие окончательно разложило дисциплину партизан, привыкших грабить и убивать мирное население при диктатуре Я. И. Тряпицына. В телеграмме Г. Х. Эйхе23 апреля 1921 г., адресованной Б. З. Шумяцкому, главком НРА сообщал, что Сахалинский отряд из-за недостатка продуктов и «отсутствия соответствующего начальника отряда» восстановил против себя местное население, «что грозит вылиться в открытое столкновение крестьян с корейцами». Отряд планировалось перевести в один из соседних районов. Эйхе просил ускорить выезд Каландаришвили «для урегулирования положения»48.Однако «Дед» смог выехать только через месяц. Между тем, 8 мая 1921 г. комсостав Сахалинского отряда сообщал главкому НРА, что назначенный командующим корейскимичастями О. Хамук неприемлем, поскольку в свое время, будучи комбатом, «порол народоармейцев». Подписавшие обращение начальник отряда Григорьев (бывший офицер, беспартийный), помощник начальника отряда Ким, военком Пак (бывший начальник Николаевского отряда), начштаба Цой (бывший начштаба 2-го летучего отряда), комбат-1 Лим,комбат-2 Анму, комбат-3 Хезаук и ряд командиров рот заявили о неподчиненииО. Хамуку49 』[1]

Оказался во главе экспедиционного отряда, посланного штабом на север к Николаевску с целью обеспечения реализации плана использования ресурсов этого региона (людских, продуктовых) для продолжения и дальнейшего развёртывания партизанской войны в Приамурье [21, с. 71].В январе 1920 г., объявив себя командующим Николаевским фронтом, и получив официальное признание в этом, фактически стал действовать как диктатор [21, с. 85, 87; 10]После захвата Николаевска-на-Амуре, инициировал, так называемый, «николаевский инцидент» 12–15 марта 1920 г., когда после, спровоцированного партизанами [23, с. 142], выступления японского отряда был уничтожен не только сам этот отряд, но и вся японская колония г. Николаевска, включая женщин, детей, консула с семьёй, раненных, пленных. Что, в конечном итоге, дало Японии повод для крупного вооружённого вмешательства в российские дела (выступлению японцев по всему Дальнему Востоку, занятию японцами северного Сахалина) хотя до этого, 4 февраля 1920 года японское командование заявило о нейтралитете, а 17 февраля начало эвакуацию своих войск с российской территории.В последних числах мая и первых числах июня 1920 года по распоряжению штаба Тряпицына, его самого, и группы приближённых к нему людей, был взорван и сожжен город Николаевск-на-Амуре [16, с. 124, 126; 4], сожжены окрестные рыбалки по побережью [16, с. 124], уничтожены обыватели города по цензу «благонадёжности» и социальной принадлежности [4; 21, с. 124–126; 16, с. 113–117]; оставшиеся в живых японцы, содержавшиеся в тюрьме в качестве пленных, а так же, несогласные с действиями Тряпицына, партизаны. В результате эвакуации части населения в тайгу почти все дети до 5 лет погибли [16, с. 160].Расстрелян 9 июля 1920 г. в посёлке Керби по приговору суда «103-х». Похоронен в общей могиле на окраине этого населённого пункта.Сепаратизм, радикализм и ультрареволюционный авантюризм Тряпицына привели к ликвидации тряпицынской диктатуры руками партизан по инициативе большевиков и их спецслужб.

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В. В. Кривенький, Е. Г. Малафеева, А. Н. Фуфыгин "ЯКОВ ТРЯПИЦЫН БЕЗ ЛЕГЕНД: НОВЫЕ ДАННЫЕ О СУДЬБЕ ПАРТИЗАНСКОГО КОМАНДИРА." eruditorum 2018 Выпуск 26 (2018). 128쪽

Ситуация коренным образом изменилась в 1920 г., уже после окончания гражданской войны на большей части бывшей Российской империии начала вывода японских войск. В марте 1920 г. отряд красных партизанпод командованием Я. И. Тряпицына устроил «революционный» террорв континентальной части Сахалинской области, не признал Дальневосточную Республику и призвал к войне с Японией. В результате вооруженного столкновения японский гарнизон в Николаевске-на-Амуре вместе совсей японской общиной был физически уничтожен. А так как, по замечанию дальневосточных коммунистов, в низовье Амура имела место«японофильская тенденция среди крестьянства»5, то вместе с японцамибыли уничтожены почти половина всего русского населения Сахалинской области. Народный суд Сахалинской области признал действияИ. Я. Тряпицина неправомерными, а сам красный командир был обвинен,«как диктатор, уклонившийся от основ Советской власти, как виновникуничтожения мирного населения»6. Виновного в уничтожении японцевкрасного командира вместе с еще пятерыми партизанами советский судприговорил к смертной казни. События в Николаевске оказали большое влияние на развитие ситуации на Сахалине.

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Дацышен, Владимир Григорьевич. "Русско-японские отношения на Северном Сахалине в период японской оккупации (1920-1925 гг.)." Ежегодник Япония 43 (2014). 194쪽

The leadership of the young Far Eastern Republic began negotiationswith the Japanese command on the withdrawal of Japanese troops fromVerkhneudinsk and the entire Transbaikal region. One of the most dramaticevents during the period of the civil war and of foreign intervention in thehistory of Russian-Japanese relations was the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident ofspring 1920. The city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was located at some distance fromthe main events; however, as a part of the intervention framework a Japanesegarrison was stationed there in 1918 because of the city’s strategic location onthe estuary of the Amur River opposite the island of Sakhalin. Furthermore,since the end of the 19th century, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was the territory’s center of gold mining. In addition to the small garrison deployed in 1918, Japanesecivilians also inhabited the city, among them the consul and his family.

The guerrilla unit of the anarchist Yakov I. Tryapitsyn, who formally recognized the Soviet regime, approached the city in January 1920. An agreementwas reached with the Japanese garrison, and the unit was allowed entry. Thepeaceful coexistence between Red guerrillas and the local population did notlast, however, and soon the soldiers launched a hunt for individuals sympathetic with the White Movement, who were arrested and executed. Arrests andexecutions of wealthy civilians followed, and by March the conflict embroiledthe Japanese military. The garrison was given a disarmament ultimatum, whichit rejected, and this led to the outbreak of armed conflict on March 12. TheJapanese were sorely outnumbered: Japanese soldiers led by Major IshikawaMasatada, who were sheltering in the barracks, and civilians, including theconsul and his family, were burned alive. Japan viewed the killing of the members of the military garrison, the consul and his family as sufficient grounds todeploy additional troops to the city and to occupy northern Sakhalin (oppositeNikolaevsk-on-Amur) for an indefinite period. Japanese units were sent to theAmur estuary from Khabarovsk and warships neared the shore in May.

Given the circumstances, Tryapitsyn’s unit retreated only after having laidthe entire city to waste: wooden structures were set alight and stone structuresblown up. The remaining population of the city retreated together (they weretaken from the city by force) with the unit but a revolt erupted only a shortdistance from the city in the town of Kerbi. Tryapitsyn was arrested, convicted,and executed on July 9, 1920, for the crime of undermining confidence in thecommunist regime among the working population (Molodyakov 2012, 194).

Soviet and modern Russian historians have conflicting views regardingthe 1920 events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Soviet historians claim that “the socalled Nikolaevsk Incident was intentionally provoked by the Japanese military in March 1920 … This incident was used by the Japanese military as apretext for various provocations for a number of years” (Kutakov 1985, 65).Some contemporary Russian scholars occasionally express a similar opinion:“The Japanese military command chose Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to be a venueof provocation … Japanese militarism deliberately sacrificed its own soldiers”(Dal’niĭ Vostok Rossiĭ 2003, 366–67). There is, however, another historiographicaccount. Already in 1924, the acclaimed journalist Anatoliĭ Gan (the pen nameof Anatoliĭ Ya. Gutman) published a chronicle of the events in his book Ruin ofNikolaevsk-on-Amur: Episodes of the Civil War in the Far East (Gibel Nikolaevskana-Amure: Stranitsy iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke). Gan traveled to Siberia and the Far East at the time of the civil war. He lived in thePrimor’e territory from 1919 to 1920, and therefore was well placed to report onthe brutal events of the spring of 1920 (Gutman 1924). Today, many historiansagree in the description of Tryapitsyn’s actions as unprecedented, baseless cruelty: “the intentional burning of an entire city, killing thousands killed with immeasurable ruins and devastation of the territory that had no parallels in thehistory of that war” (Nelyubova 2012, 291).』[2]

Наиболее ярким примером стал так называемый «николаевский инцидент» — резня японцев, а затем и горожан, учиненная повстанцами Я. Тряпицына в Николаевске-на-Амуре. Партизаны, нарушив перемирие с японским гарнизоном, захватили, а затем расстреляли японских заложников, а заодно и «нетрудовое» население города (в том числе немногочисленную интеллигенцию). Оставшихся в живых бандиты насильно увели с собой через тайгу на средний Амур (в партизанский очаг — так называемый «красный остров»). На месте Николаевска осталось безлюдное пепелище.

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Азаренков, Александр Алексеевич. "https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=42389327Дальневосточная республика как периферийная модель преодоления системного кризиса традиционной империи." Гражданская война на востоке России (ноябрь 1917-декабрь 1922 г.). 2019. 181-182

『빨치산 부대의 퇴각을 결정한 트랴피친은 “반(反)소비에트 분자들”을 처형하며 도시를 파괴하기 시작했다. 약 4천 명의 주민이 학살되었고, 피신할 수 있었던 일부를 제외한 대다수 주민들은 폐허가 된 도시를 빨치산들과 떠날 수 밖에 없었다.』[3]

Compared with Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk had been an oasis of calm until January 1920 when a large partisan force under Yakov Triapitsyn approached along the Amur “liberating one upstream village after another.* Consul Ishida telegraphed his concern to Tokyo, but ice clogging the Amur and the Tatar Strait precluded either withdrawal or reinforcement. Snowballing to 4,000 armed men as it advanced, Triapitsyn's band annihilated small Russian and Japanese detachments sent out to stop it. It reached the outskirts of Nikolaevsk in late January, cut the telegraph line to Khabarovsk, and put the town under siege. Capturing nearby Fort Chnyrrakh, the partisans bombarded Nikolaevsk with field artillery. Against the advice of the Russian garrison commander, Ishikawa negotiated with Triapitsyn. The upshot was an agreement concluded on 28 February that opened the town to the partisans while allowing the Japanese to keep their arms. The next day Triapitsyn triumphantly entered Nikolae proclaimed Soviet rule, and arrested about 100 Russian officers (the garrison commander committed suicide).

[144쪽~145쪽]Amid boisterous festivities Triapitsyn requisitioned homes, arrested community leaders, and executed the officers already in custody. On 10 March the partisan chief told the Japanese that they too must surrender their arms. With no way to communicate with the outside world (Triapitsun controlled the telegraph), Major Ishikawa and Consul Ishida decided to launch a surprise attack on Triapitsyn's headquarters with all available Japanese military personnel and armed civilians. They struck early in the morning of 12 March, but Triapitsyn survived and counterattacked, killing most of the Japanese population, including Major Ishikawa. Consul Ishida committed suicide with his family. The 136 Japanese survivors, mostly women, children, and wounded, were imprisoned.
[*Triapitsyn appears to have been employed in a Petrograd metal works and to have served as a noncommissioned officer in the Imperial Army before coming to the Far East in 1918. By Nov. 1919 he was leading a band of 1,500 Russians, 300 Chinese, 200 Koreans, some Hungarian internationalists, and local aborigines. Nina Lebedeva, sent by the Red Army Military Revolutionary Staff to keep an eye on him, became his chief of staff and lover.]

[145쪽]When Tokyo learned of the fate of its Nikolaevsk garrison, the Japanese commanders in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok were ordered to render the Bolsheviks "incapable” of injuring Japanese lives and interests, a bureaucratic euphemism for taking revenge. On the night of 4-5 April, three days after the last American troop transport had steamed out of the Golden Horn, Japanese units assaulted known and suspected Red organizations in Vladivostok, Nikolsk-Ussuriisk, Spassk, Posyet, and Khabarovsk. Both sides took heavy casualties: 1,000 Japanese and 3,000 “Bolsheviks,” among them Sergei Lazo.
Although officially chairman of the Vladivostok Zemstvo Government's Military Council, Lazo was known to be the top Red partisan commander in the Far East and as such ranked high on the Japanese hit list. Lazo gave a false name when picked up on the night of 4-5 April, but his captors knew better and after several days of questioning transported him and two others (one being former secretary of the Vladivostok soviet Vsevolod Sibirtsev) in mail bags to an Ussuri Line station called Muraviev-Amursky, where the three were handed over to a Don Cossack named Bochkarev. When Lazo struggled as he was being taken out of the bag, Bochkarev's men knocked him unconscious and threw him into a locomotive furnace. His two companions followed, having been first shot inside their bags.

[145~146쪽]After the Imperial Army had extracted a measure of revenge, a Foreign Ministry representative apologized for “unauthorized actions” and set up a joint “Russo-Japanese conciliation commission” in Vladivostok. Meanwhile, under Japanese tutelage, a new zemstvo government was installed, presided over by a Menshevik. The Japanese found a cooperative figure in Vasily Boldyrev, a former tsarist officer who had represented the Omsk government in Tokyo, to succeed Lazo as chairman of the military council On 29 April the new government and Tokyo concluded an agreement dubbed by critics a “Far Eastern Brest-Litovsk,” providing for a twenty-mile zone around southern Primorye towns, rail lines, and roads within which only Japanese and Japanese-approved Russian police were permitted to bear arms.
[*The Bolsheviks lost an energetic commander but gained a revolutionary martyr. In a 1924 poem, "Vladimir Ilych Lenin,” Vladimir Mayakovsky depicted Lazo being held by Japanese soldiers, one of whom pours molten lead down his throat as another shouts, “Recant!” Lazo gurgles: “Long live communism!” Lazo's murderers were hardly original. Approximately two years earlier, on 13 June 1918, instruments of revolutionary justice in Perm threw Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, his English secretary, and his chauffeur alive into a factory furnace.]

[146쪽]The Japanese sortie of 4-5 April, followed by relief expeditions from Khabarovsk and Otaru (Hokkaido), had fateful results for thousands of hostages in Nikolaevsk. As the relief forces drew near in the last days of May, the partisans put to death their 136 Japanese prisoners, slaughtered approximately 4,000 Russian men, women, and children, and after torching the town, herded a couple of thousand dazed survivors up the Amgun River to Kerbi. 11 When Japanese forces entered Nikolaevsk on 3 June, they found the town in ashes and the river clogged with bloated corpses. Amid journalistically fanned public outrage, Tokyo charged Moscow with responsibility and on 3 July announced that the Imperial Army was occupying northern Sakhalin until the “incident was resolved.
Triapitsyn's homicidal proclivities concerned Moscow only because their visibility jeopardized the success of its buffer strategy. By arousing a powerful neighbor that Lenin and Trotsky wanted to neutralize, Triapitsyn had made himself an unwanted witness whose testimony could prove embarrassing. Accordingly, Triapitsyn, his mistress Nina Lebedeva, and twentythree followers were quickly executed at Kerbi on 11 July after having been found guilty of murdering four Communists. The fate of over 4,000 Nikolaevsk residents was not mentioned in the proceedings. Judicial choreography did not deter Tokyo from raising the ante for withdrawing its forces from Russian territory.

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Stephan, John J. The Russian Far East: A History, Stanford University Press , 1994, 144~146쪽

Triapitsyn's forces then systematically destroyed as much of the city as they could before the arrival of the Japanese and escaped, fleeing in scattered bands to the taiga. The largest body struck out for Blagoveshchensk, a city on the Amur controlled by the Far Eastern Republic.34 E. Ech, a journalist from Vladivostok, visited Nikolaevsk in the middle of July. He described what he saw: "Everywhere, as far as the eye could reach, there were only ruins of houses; here and there lonely house chimneys, the tall chimney of the blown up electric plant, half-sunken vessels .... Only on the outskirts of the town was smoke coming from the chimneys of houses that had fortunately survived. Of all the buildings within the town itself only the trade school and the prison (a stone building] remained intact.”35 On June 3, 1920, the Japanese relief force landed at Nikolaevsk. Russian survivors of the atrocities slowly returned to the city and and began to rebuild their lives, bringing the episode to a close.』[5]

Triapitsyn embarked on his own course of action, using the rhetoric of Bolshevism to gather soldiers on the way to Nikolaevsk. Many of the recruits undoubtedly believed the ideology he espoused. Triapitsyn himself placed little value in a higher ideology and seemed to use it only to legitimate the actions of his forces. This did not go unnoticed by those under his command. Anton Zakharovich Ovchinnikov, who joined Triapitsyn after the March massacre, recounted the following conversation with a member of his company:
“You know, Comrade Ovchinnikov, you could vouch for it that I was sent by Kolchak to the Sakhalin prison for having Bolshevik ideas and that all of us—Comrades Voitinsky, Slepak, Gorschkov, Sergeev-fought and are still fighting for justice for the laboring people. I am a sailor from the Baltic Fleet; I have taken part in the revolution from its first days and have seen all kinds of fighting; but, Comrade Ovchinnikov, if you only knew what goes on here—it's horrible. (He dropped his voice still lower.) Every night whole families are killed, because, as the partisans say, they are burzhui. Comrade Orchinnikov, this is not justice. What is this bloodshed for, and what have the women and children to do with it?43”

Another companion complained that “over here plain working people call us bandits. It is terrible what's going on in town.”:
Justbefore his death, Colonel Witz, commander of a detachment of Whiteforces near Nikolaevsk, had an interview with Triapitsyn. Herecounted part of a conversation he had with the partisan leader in aletter to the Inspector of the lighthouse in de Castry, where he hadmade his final stand before being captured, and asked the inspectorto inform Triapitsyn "that it is time to stop fooling theexhausted Russian people which he leads to ruin.” Revealing hisknowledge of the partisan leader's true motives, Witz remembered aneven earlier meeting in Mariinsk where Triapitsyn declared himself“an anarchist ... against the existing authority and therefore, ...am against the Soviets."45 Presumably, this included theKhabarovsk Soviet which originally ordered him to Nikolaevsk.Triapitsyn used Bolshevism as a vehicle for personal prestige andpower instead of revolution and social change. The victims of hisatrocities during his stay in Nikolaevsk included “not only personsof the ‘Right' groups, but also liberal socialists and even severalBolsheviks.46

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Hackemer, Kurt. The Nikolaevsk massacre and Japanese expansion in Siberia. American Asian Review 16.2, 1998, 122~124쪽

The American historian John Albert White wrote of the Chinese and Korean Red partisans:
One of the interesting features of the partisan struggle was the participation in it ofnon-Russian peoples. Many of the natives as well as the Chinese living in EasternSiberia whose part in the Russian life of the area had been tenuous before this timejoined the [Red/Bolshevik] forces or aided them with food, clothing, and shelter.The Koreans in particular were strong supporters of the movement.
Political loyalty during the Intervention was not strictly defined by nationality. Duringa Red partisan siege of Nikolaevsk (March-April 1920). Many of Russian businessmenand managers there were considered ‘collaborators’ with the Japanese. After thevictory, Triapitsyn (a Red partisan) and his forces massacred the residents of Nikolaevtargeting especially the Russians (because a large proportion had worked for Japanesebusinesses in the fishing and shipping industries of Nikolaevsk) and the Japanese.Triapitsyn’s army of two thousand men included 300 Chinese and 200 Korean Redpartisans.

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Chang, Jon K. "Tsarist continuities in Soviet nationalities policy: A case of Korean territorial autonomy in the Soviet Far East, 1923-1937." Eurasia Studies societ of Great Britain & Europe Journal 3.1 (2014), 14쪽

By 1920 it was obvious to everyone that the Allied operation, aimed at replacing Lenin’sBolshevik government with a White Russian administration more sympathetic to Alliedinterests, had failed. By November 1920, all foreign troops except the Japanese withdrew from Russian territories. The Japanese Army made no plans to evacuate,however, and the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident in the spring of 1920 provided an opportunity to prolong the Japanese Expedition. Japanese forces had occupied Nikolaevsk inthe summer of 1918, largely to protect the considerable Japanese fishery business in theregion, until the town was attacked by guerrillas under Iakov Triapitsyn. In what isknown as the Nikolaevsk Massacre, more than 700 Japanese officers and town residentswere killed, in addition to 8,000 Russian citizens. The Soviets, who captured and executed Triapitsyn in July 1920, claimed he was an anarchist, not a Bolshevik.33 The Japanese Army seized this opportunity to start a propaganda offensive at home. Newspapersreported gruesome stories about the murdered 5,000 Japanese citizens (rather than theactual 700), including women and children. The number of murdered Russian peoplewas omitted. Press conferences of war journalists attracted considerable crowds.Around the country, memorial services were held with members of the imperial family in attendance. The murdered military officers were enshrined at Yasukuni, thenational religious memorial for the war dead. The Nikolaevsk Incident was thetipping point after which Japanese public indifference to the events in Russia yieldedto passionate anti-Bolshevik attitudes.

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Tatiana Linkhoeva, The Russian Revolution and the Emergence of Japanese Anticommunism, Revolutionary Russia, 31:2, 2018, 268~269

On the night of the 25th, the Red Army burned down the prison in Nikolayevsk, killing 134 imprisoned Japanese soldiers. On the 26th, they burned the entire town, massacring a total of 834 Japanese and 4,000 Russians, while the Red Army suffered approximately 500 casualties; 100 Chinese expatriates and one British citizen were caught in the crossfire and killed.[6]

1920년 1월 24일 빨치산군 사자使者가 일본군수비대에 와서 화평을 제의하였으나, 일본군수비대장은 빨치산군을 ‘하나의 강도단’이라고 간주하고 그 제의를 거절하였다. 뿐만아니라 수비대장은 이 사자를 헌병대에 유치하였다 러시아백위군의 방첩부에 넘겼고, 방첩부에서는 이 사자를 살해하였다. 2월 2일 러시아빨치산부대가 니콜라에프스크의 요충지인 취늬라흐요새를 점령하고, 일본군병영에 포격을 가했다. 블라고베시첸스크 주둔 일본군 백수白水 제14사단장의 반복되는 중립원칙 고수 훈령을 따르지 않던 일본군수비대는 2월 28일 러시아빨치산부대와 중립고수와 백위군의 완전무장해제를 핵심으로 하는 평화협정을 체결하였다. 이어 2월 29일 빨치산부대가 한인과 중국인을 비롯한 노동자·시민들의 환영을 받으며 니콜라예프스크항에 입성하였다. 러시아빨치산부대내에는 ‘니항군대’·‘사할린군대’또는 ‘박일리야군대’라 불리게 되는 약 500명에 달하는 한인부대가 편성되어 있었는데, 아무르강 주변의 금광에서 일하는 노동자금전꾼들이 주축을 이루었다. 빨치산부대는 소비에트를 조직하고 임시집행위원회를 설치하였으며, 백위파 옴스크정부의 관리·장교·자본가를 체포하여 재판에 회부하여 처형하였다. 3월 5일에는 백위군의 무장해제를 단행했다. 빨치산측이 3월 12일 정오를 시한으로 무기와 탄약의 인도를 요구하자, 일본군수비대와 영사관은 러시아빨치산부대를 공격하기로 결정했다. 그리하여 3월 11일 저녁 빨치산 본부에서 개최된 연회에 참석하였던 일본군수비대장 석천石川과 영사 석전石田은 12일 1시 30분 빨치산참모본부를 기습·공격하였다. 이 공격으로 트랴삐친은 수류탄에 발을 부상당하였고, 참모장 나우모프는 중상으로 입고 다음날 사망하였다. 곧이어 빨치산부대의 반격으로 2일만에 일본군은 대패하였고 3월 18일 항복하였다. 당시 아무르강에 정박하고 있던 중국함대 4척은 일본군을 공격하고, 일본영사관에 포격을 가했다. 당시 일본거류민들은 일본군과 함께 전투에 참여하였다가 거의 다 사망하였다. 즉 3월 12일의 제1차 니항사건에서는 러시아빨치산부대가 무고한 거류민을 학살한 것이 아니라, 전투과정에서 전사한 것이었다. 당시 일본군의 병력은 육군전투원 288명, 동비전투원 32명, 해군무선전신대 43명, 그외 재류민자위단, 재향군인으로부터 구성되었는데, 살아 남은병력은 100명거류민 13이었다. 3월 12일의 전투에서 일본인들은 러시아빨치산들에게 무방비상태에서 피살된 것이 아니라 전투에 참여하였다가 대부분이 전사한 것이었다.註23) 이 전투에서 살아남은 일본인 136명은 여자, 아이들과 부상자들이었고 이들은 감옥에 감금되었다. 註24)

(…)

이에 일본정부는 “일본인민의 생명을 보호한다”는 구실하에서 원동 무장간섭을 더욱 강화하였다. 아무르강의 통행을 가로막고 있던 얼음이 풀리기 시작하는 1920년 5월말 일본원정군의 입성에 임박하여 러시아빨치산부대는 니콜라예프스크항을 철수하면서 136명의 일본인 죄수들과 약 4천명의 러시아인어른, 아이들을 학살하였고, 도시를 완전히 불태웠다. 니콜라예프스크항에 입성한 후 일본은 7월 3일 북위 51도 이북 사할린을 점령하고 ‘니항사건’이 해결될 때까지 철수하지 않겠다고 선언하였다. 註26)

1920년 4월 4~5일 밤에 일본군에 의한 연해주 각지에서 러시아혁명세력과 한인들에 대한 대대적인 학살과 공격은 니항사건에 대한 일본군의 보복적 반격의 성격이 강하다. 일본정부는 4월 9일 니콜라예프스크항구에의 증강된 군대를 파견하기로 결정하였다. 5월 중순이 되면서 아무르강의 얼음이 녹는 해빙기가 돌아오면서 니콜라예프스크항의 긴장이 고조되었으며, 트랴삐친의 빨치산부대는 니콜라예프스크로부터의 철수를 준비하였다. 러시아빨치산부대는 주민들을 암군강 계곡의 껠비촌으로 소개시켰으며 부대도 이 방면으로 퇴각하였다. 껠비촌에서 산을 넘어 아무르주의 브라고베시첸스크로 갈 예정이었다. 트랴삐친은 브라고베시첸스크로 들어가 이 지역의 막시말리스트들과 합류하여 원동공화국안완충국안을 반대하는 투쟁을 전개하기로 계획하였다. 철수직전인 5월 하순 트리야삐친은 엄청난 규모의 테러를 자행하여 3천명에 달하는 주민들을 처형하였으며, 5월 24~25일 감옥에 남아있던 130명의 일본인들을 처형하였다거류민은 12명, 나머지는 군인. 이어 5월 30일, 6월 1일~2일 니콜라예프스크 시를 방화하였다.』[7]